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Failure is seen as a problem in education. From failing
schools, to failing students to rankings of universities,
literacy or numeracy, the perception that one has failed to
compete or to compare favourably with others has led
to a series of policy initiatives internationally designed to
ensure ‘success for all’. But when success is measured in
comparison with others or against benchmarks or standards,
then it is impossible to see how all could be successful given
the parameters laid down. What are the implications of a
culture that values success and achievement? How difficult is
it to become the kind of individual who is flourishing,
autonomous and becomes ‘all she can be’, in particular
under the precarious conditions of contemporary capitalism?
Samuel Beckett was sceptical of the quest for progress,
production and prestige. His philosophy invites another way
of thinking about failure, not as something one is, but rather
as something one does: the pain and fear of inadequacy that
can mark educational relations and experiences is alleviated
by a more renunciative, gentle philosophy of education.
There are two interwoven strands in this article. One
questions the emphasis on competition and achievement in
contemporary education and explores its implications for our
relationship to failure. The second, strongly influenced by
Beckett, explores ways of reimagining our relationship to
failure in such a way that allows us to reflect on what
matters in life.
DO I ASK TOO MUCH?
Our ideas depend on dialogue with others, but it can be easy to forget their
origins in those relationships that orient our intellectual lives. The articles
by Caroline Wilson, Sharon Todd and Rachel Jones in this Special Issue
serve as a reminder of the importance of acknowledging our relational
origins and our debt to others, helping us become more attuned to the ways
in which the genesis of ideas is often bound up with the lives of others, our
interlocutors. This article was born in failure, the failure to have an idea, or
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more precisely the failure to generate an idea of which I could be named the
sole progenitor. It began with conversations in a prison on Samuel Beckett
and pedagogy, conversations that emerged from our classes in philosophy.
This article is dedicated to the man, the student in my class, whose interest
in Beckett and whose illuminating readings of his writings invited me to
reimagine failure.
Given the manner in which many, though not all, of his characters display
antipathy toward children, and, unlike Luisa Muraro (see Caroline Wilson,
this issue), seem to be convinced that it would have been better to never
have been born (but since one has been, one must persist), whilst evincing
a committed incapacity to be in any ordinary sense ‘productive citizens’,
the writings of Samuel Beckett might seem a peculiar choice when reflect-
ing upon philosophy of education. Yet, if one wishes to look at the world
through a different lens, through those occupying its underside or its
outside, then Beckett helps one do so without condescension or pity. His
writings prompt consideration of some of the ways in which humans are
situated on a graduated scale of recognisable humanity, teaching us how to
develop another relationship to failure. His views on success, prestige and
failure are traced through the denizens and anti-heroes of his prose and
plays. His characters tend not to have much understanding of what is even
meant by a ‘normal’, flourishing human life. Says one his most infamous
characters, Molloy, of manners, ‘On this subject I had only negative and
empirical notions, which means that I was in the dark, most of the time, and
all the more completely as a lifetime of observations had left me doubting
the possibility of systematic decorum, even within a limited area’ (Beckett,
1979, p. 25). Slapstick and bawdy humour puncture the erudite witticisms
of the so-called intellectuals and philosophers he portrays. In later writings,
Beckett’s images of the human become ever more subtractive, bare, inten-
sive and generic, more like the wind or light, eliminating those all-too-
human attributes that serve not only to identify and classify, but also to
distinguish us from one another: each one becomes utterly singular, in a
way that resonates with some of the descriptions offered by Rebecca Adami
and Sharon Todd in this issue. Characters, even those made manifest
through ebbs of intensity and bare descriptions of movement and breath,
are often absorbed with preoccupations, rituals and programmes that seem
foreign to those of ordinary humans. At moments they experience delight in
the world and even ecstasy; much of the time they simply go on, living lives
that elude familiar forms of narrative or temporal structure. Yet a closer
look at their practices, observations and questions pushes us to question the
purported logic of our own regimes of living, and to pay more attention to
our unruly minds. Beckett’s works are difficult and their themes might
seem foreign to the concerns of those of us who work in education, but they
are instructive because of their contemplations upon the human condition
and their reflections upon ethics.
It is seldom that one finds such characters being either judgemental or
displaying too much concern about what others think of them. It is not
difficult to find something liberating in this indifference, not to others per
se, but to what others make of us. Such indifference does not foreclose
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gestures of kindness or solidarity with others. Often Beckett’s characters
make clear our profound dependence on others, as well the difficulty of
getting along: couples like Vladimir and Estragon, in Waiting for Godot
(Beckett, 2006), or Mercier and Camier, in the novel of the same name
(Beckett, 1994b), do not need to understand each other, or even have
anything in common, to stick with one other. The apparent disregard for
what is supposed to constitute a ‘successful’ human life can give consola-
tion to those who feel cowed by the pressures of success, allowing a space
for the rather basic question of ‘why’ to be asked—Why do I desire this?
Why do I seek recognition from them? Why is my career so important?
Why do I need to know this? When in Worstward Ho, Beckett writes, ‘Ever
tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ (1983, p. 7),
this serves to comfort. The kindly ‘No matter’ does not allude to prospec-
tive success or achievement but rather seems to encourage: ‘Don’t worry’,
‘Keep going’, ‘Keep trying’, ‘On’. It is unsurprising that artists have been
drawn to this phrase, and indeed toward the end of this article I will
examine some of these practices.1
There are two interwoven strands in this article. One questions the
emphasis on competition and achievement in contemporary education and
its implications for our relationship to failure. The second, strongly influ-
enced by Beckett, explores ways of reimagining our relationship to failure
in such a way that allows us to reflect on what matters in life.2
We may come to wonder whether we ask too much of humanity and of
education when faced with images of mastery, autonomy, competition,
potential, competence, flourishing and perfection that continue to inform
philosophical principles that underpin educational practice. Christine
Winter, Rebecca Adami, and Caroline Wilson, in particular, underline the
corrosive effects of such aspirations. It may be wiser, as Sharon Todd
suggests in Toward an Imperfect Education: Facing Humanity, Rethinking
Cosmopolitanism that we temper our expectations of what education might
achieve, and likewise to blunt and diminish those ambitions that tend to be
most bolstered by a culture of competitiveness and standards that is, de
facto, cultivated in many educational systems. Education cannot serve as
the solution to society’s ills and failures. Throughout his writings, one of
Beckett’s targets is education. The educational endeavour is often provoca-
tively described as an exercise of relative futility, which offers, nonetheless,
a form of distraction and an occasionally pleasant, occasionally taxing, way
of passing time. In The Unnameable, the voice, Worm, seems confused by
this practice, failing to grasp what the purpose of such an activity might be,
although it seems nonetheless to have left its mark, for good or ill.
What puzzles me is the thought of being indebted for this information
to persons with whom I can never have been in contact. Can it be
innate knowledge? Like that of good and evil. This seems improbable
to me. But what they were most determined for me to swallow was my
fellow creatures. In this they were without mercy. I remember little or
nothing of these lectures. I cannot have understood a great deal. But
I seem to have retained certain descriptions, in spite of myself. They
262 A. O’Donnell
© 2014 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
gave me courses on love, on intelligence, most precious, most pre-
cious. They also taught me to count, and even to reason. Some of this
rubbish has come in handy on occasions, I don’t deny it, on occasions
which would never have arisen if they left me in peace (Beckett, 1979,
p. 273).
Although some might read such words as nonsense or even cynical, they
have the effect of deflating grandiose claims of the impact of education in
order to return us to reflection upon what matters in life. This comes to pass
without self-indulgence, self-hatred, pessimism or delusion, allowing us to
be rather more circumspect about what we educators do. It reminds us that
little of the knowledge transmitted to students, even with vigour, passion
and enthusiasm, is digested or assimilated, but that ideas seep through
nonetheless, and playing with them can be rather enjoyable. So much of
what Beckett writes underlines the bleakness and futility of human exist-
ence. The expectation that we could ever escape this suffering serves only
to compound it. Still, what I find most moving in his characters is they
persist in spite of this, and as they do they find small comforts, decency and
camaraderie. Perhaps this is as much as we can hope for.
AN ANTI-HEROIC CURRICULUM
Rather than seeking to eliminate failure, it is more interesting to think about
how the concept of failure could be reimagined if, as Beckett suggests,
failure is not accompanied by disappointment but became simply what we
do, rather than being something we are. It might afford a greater capacity
to discern which kinds of failure are preferable and why we seem incapable
of acknowledging the futility of many of the ways in which lives are spent,
or expended. Failure is inevitable in practices that remain open to the
world, through which the ‘unknown’ is allowed breathing space rather than
resisted in an endless quest to master, confine and navigate the terrain of the
known. For Beckett, failure is just part of what it is to be human and what
matters is that one persists without seeking sanctuary in the hope of future
salvation, transcendent or worldly. If we are closed to the possibility of
failure, then we are closed to life’s openness and unpredictability: we make
of ourselves impermeable gods. Looking at failure in this light is not simply
a matter of making the rather obvious statement that even when we set
goals for ourselves (goals which can often be, in Beckett’s view, rather
unreflective and pointless), these are often frustrated or interrupted. More
importantly, it asks us to question the ethics of those who refuse to coun-
tenance failure, seeking control and/or justifying success in their chosen
sphere at any cost. In this respect, Beckett asks us who we become if we
refuse to allow failure into our lives. However, he is not suggesting that we
should seek out failure or despair; we should take comfort where we can
and find solace in such happiness that comes into our lives. Krapp, in
Krapp’s Last Tape, only retrospectively understands the significance of his
moment of happiness, but he does not live in regret:
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Past midnight. Never knew such silence. The earth might be
uninhabited.
Pause.
Here I end this reel. Box—(pause)—three, spool—(pause)—five.
(Pause.) Perhaps my best years are gone. When there was a chance of
happiness. But I wouldn’t want them back. Not with the fire in me
now. No, I wouldn’t want them back (Beckett, 1994a, p. 22).
Ruth Cigman (2001, and this issue) has argued that the question is not
whether one should seek happiness but rather how we should do so. How
we go about living also matters for Beckett. Although he would not have
such confidence in the possibility of happiness, his writings bring us to ask
ourselves not only why we have certain aims, but also how we attain such
aims. Those who find their desires and objectives are seldom frustrated are
viewed with some suspicion, as they tend, in his view, to be indifferent to
the effects of their actions on the lives of others and the earth: capitalism is
consummately tyrannical in its indifference to the lives of others. Such
people readily find ways of explaining away their cruelty or indifference.
This is not to suggest that we might have a perfect state of affairs were
people to become more enlightened, but the world might become a little
less brutal were we to face reality and face humanity.
In his book Simone Weil and the Intellect of Grace, Henry Finch com-
ments on the continuation of a Roman legacy in education systems popu-
lated, broadly speaking, by heroes; even the under-trodden in the stories of
the curriculum overcome in their own way, and those who do not are to be
pitied or given charity. Sharon Todd observes that:
[t]he idea that education can ameliorate certain global conditions
under the sign of humanity is a worrying proposition, not least
because it fails to recognize that the very injustices and antagonisms
which are the targets of such education are created and sustained
precisely through our human talent for producing them (2010, p. 9).
We tend to promote a broadly positive and hopeful idea of humanity in
education. Beckett’s writings prompt consideration of some of the ways in
which reimagined curricula might introduce a more gentle and minimal set
of principles, evocative of a politics of decency rather than one of flour-
ishing. Whilst there is an understandable desire to see the next generation
as the one capable of resolving the horrors of the world, perhaps it might be
more helpful to children and students were there to be more honest descrip-
tions about the state of the world and the prospects for most human lives.
Curricular stories could describe anti-heroes like Beckett’s characters, who
are tramps, refugees, clowns, psychiatric patients and denizens—those
usually made invisible or set to the margins of systems—in a way that
avoids presenting people as objects of pity in need of welfare or moral
transformation or, perhaps worse, as exotic outsiders, since such
approaches tend to consolidate the role of agency with the ‘privileged’.
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Unfortunately, benevolent gestures can unwittingly serve to reinforce hier-
archical relationships, creating a feeling of self-satisfaction on the part of
the benefactor whilst making of the beneficiary an object of pity.
How one responds to the one who has nothing, reveals who one is. How
one responds to having nothing also reveals something of oneself. But
unlike fairy stories, there is no moment of redemption or transformation at
the end of the stories. In the Trilogy, Molloy rejects gestures of pity and
charity with vehemence.
Let me tell you this, when social workers offer you, free, gratis and for
nothing, something to hinder you from swooning, which with them is
an obsession, it is useless to recoil, they will pursue you to the ends of
the earth, the vomitory in their hands. The Salvation Army is no better.
Against the charitable gesture there is no defence that I know of. You
sink your head, you put out your hands all trembling and twined
together and you say, Thank you, thank you lady, thank you kind lady
(Beckett, 1979, p. 38).
Unfortunately, it is easy to be blind to one’s motivations and to the secret
pleasures that arise through pity and charity rather than compassion. Ges-
tures of benevolence can reinforce the ways in which another is seen (and
sees himself or herself as lesser, depending on how much power one holds
in a given situation).
Of the desire for prestige and the power that accompanies such gestures,
Finch writes that, ‘. . . prestige like everything illusory, is based on imagi-
nation. It is the imagination that gives people the fascinating power to
seem more than human, enabling them to treat with contempt the
nobodies beneath them who accept this treatment with pleasure’ (1999, p.
65). The most reliable ways of securing prestige are fear, cruelty and
terror, which can take more or less evident form. In cultures that see
themselves as meritocratic, failure to conform or attain the ‘goods’ of
‘recognition’, ‘agency’ or ‘material well-being’ (to put a more acceptable
gloss on prestige, power, or money) can mean that one is seen or sees
oneself as individually blameworthy. However, there remain those, like
Beckett, who simply refuse to accept that these constitute the goods of a
human life. He does not see ‘lessness’ as a matter for moral condemnation
or solicitude, and he does not presume that those who have power are to
be envied.
THE IDOLS OF PRESTIGE, PROGRESS AND PERFECTION
The confusion is not my invention. We cannot listen to a conversation
for five minutes without being acutely aware of the confusion. It is all
around us and our only chance now is to let it in. The only chance of
renovation is to open our eyes and see the mess. It is not a mess you
can make sense of (Beckett quoted in Driver, 1961, p. 22).
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Beckett’s writings offer an honest, if devastating, commitment to the sur-
gical excision of any remnants of delusions, illusions, utopias, salvific
narratives or ideals that might give false comfort to a human life. He strives
to articulate an ethical position that, rather than taking refuge in speculation
about how the world ought to be, helps human beings to respond coura-
geously to how things are—‘how it is’, as he writes. This is described well
by John Calder who says, ‘The presence of evil cannot be denied. The most
casual look around reveals it everywhere, it is always in a dominating
position and the most that can be done by those endowed with moral
instincts is to combat it, under duress, with every possible sacrifice and
personal inconvenience’ (2001, p. 41). He argues that the message of
Beckett’s work is ‘in saying to as much of humanity as will listen, that if it
learns to forgo personal ambition and think in terms of cooperation, com-
passion and companionship, it will be happier’ (2001, p. 138). Whether or
not Calder is correct in his analysis, it serves as an interesting provocation
to those of us working and participating in systems of education. It moves
one to ask what effect the principle of competition has on the experience of
education, to what extent the control mechanisms of an administered
society affect relationships to failure, and, whether what Sarah Ahmed
(2010) describes in The Promise of Happiness as the normalising injunc-
tion to be happy forecloses or brackets the affective complexity which is
constitutive of a human life. Some will suggest that concern with what
others think of us can serve to motivate ethical action, yet one could counter
that the mere existence of another human being demands a response of
kindness, decency, civility and care, whatever that person may think of us.
Indeed, a supererogatory ethic would not require recognition for such
gestures.
We are thus invited to think of failure as an inevitable dimension of being
human in the world to which our response is simply to persist. This
clear-sighted realism seeks to see things as they are, rather than always
hoping for a better world and imagining better human beings. Any better-
ment that arises is singular and often temporary, involving small efforts to
alleviate suffering where it is witnessed, rather than the construction of
grand projects of social engineering. Beckett’s writings challenge and
draw to light the corrosive effect of some of the fundamental aims and
assumptions shaping educational practice and policy, in particular, as I have
indicated, the principle of competition and the quest for prestige, in respect
of which liberalism and libertarianism maintain an agnostic position.
Instead of flourishing or even autonomy, a more measured, more gentle and
renunciative approach to education and to life is suggested. This is does not
mean a life of unabated despair: life involves many moments, some of
absurdity and curiosity, others provoked by experiences of the joys of
memory, the open skies and muddy landscapes. A so-called ‘successful’ life
can be impoverished and insensible. For some it will seem heretical to rail
against the idols of progress, perfection and production that have come to
mark social relations in contemporary liberal democratic capitalist soci-
eties: a brief glance at many course descriptions, curricular principles,
mission statements, and ‘philosophies’ of educational institutions reveal
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that perfectionist, progressive and aspirational discourses continue to
define implicitly and explicitly the way in which humanity is understood in
education, whilst the emphasis on competence and measurable outcomes
underscore that what matters is success measured against standards. Given
the de facto use of bell curves in many courses, it is peculiar that little
attention is given to the impossibility of universal success. This is not to say
that all should pass examinations, but rather that we should be more truthful
about the prospects of failure and more circumspect about their function—
many of my first year students write in their philosophy essays of how they
now dread thinking because of the way in which the need for success in
examinations over-determined and distorted their experiences of learning.
Some forms of assessment are valuable whilst others undermine the rela-
tionship to education. I also see this in prison where many of the men with
whom I work failed to meet the required national standards in schools, and
thus felt themselves to be failures. Children see through all of this quite
quickly once they enter school. To question such aspirations can appear
both obtuse and wrong-headed. Surely we ought to encourage the growth,
autonomy, achievement and flourishing of children and young people in
education? However, competition rooted in comparison contributes to a
way of relating to failure that understands it in terms of one’s being and
one’s failure to match up to others.
FEELING LIKE A FAILURE
The relationship to failure raises a range of questions in respect of both
students’ self-conceptualisation and their relation to their peers, to those in
authority and to societal norms. If the dominant way of understanding
failure in education is to judge success in relation to a standard or norm,
then failure is a relative term contingent upon what that standard or norm
prescribes. Failure understood in relation to success itself presupposes that
there be a standard to serve as a benchmark, be it conventional, statistical
and/or artificial. One compares oneself with others in that process. The
principle of competition determines how and whether one matches up that
standard and to one’s peers. However, it is not inevitable that failure be
understood from within an economy of comparison or competition. One
might think from the perspective of failure and incompetence, emphasising
not outcome but process. Certain ways of failing can be helpful and useful
(although, of course, others are not, such as moral or ethical failure).
Failure can be uncoupled from judgement and expectation, and the rela-
tionship between failure and experimentation in contemporary art practice,
as we will see below, helps us to understand better how. This raises the
question of whether practices and institutions of education need to be
reimagined in order to bracket conventional understandings of success, so
that failure might come to be understood not as being a failure and as a
deficit of being—a relatively new concept according to Scott Sandage
(2010)—but in terms of the activity of failing. This is not to make failure
the telos of one’s actions, which would return it to the framework of
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success, but rather invites us to think about failure and incompetence
in terms of experimentation and the ‘trying things out’ that is immanent
to any practice. This might serve as a counter-balance to those discourses
that emphasise success or happiness. Might a counter-narrative to that of
autonomy, agency, productivity and flourishing make a difference to stu-
dents’ self-understanding, relationships with others and relationship with
failure? John Calder suggests that,
[a] service that Beckett has done for many is to take away their fear of
inadequacy. The pressure of education, of parents, and of society itself
to be successful, an achiever, a person of means and power, is always
great. The purpose of such ambition can only be itself. . . . The very
effort of achieving something in the world tends to inhibit the ability
to ask why and any desire to find a meaning or purpose to the effort,
other than self-aggrandisement (2001, p. 138).
Calder perhaps over-states matters in speaking of self-aggrandisement, but
it allows us to reflect upon the goods of a human life, and the values that
ought underpin it, however he is right in pointing to students’ fear of
inadequacy. One form of resistance commonly exercised by students is
silence, but what causes this? When I asked my students, who continued to
remain resolutely silent in tutorials on critical thinking, why students don’t
participate, they spoke of a familiar litany of reasons: fear, lack of confi-
dence, fear of looking stupid, fear of getting it wrong, fear of failure.
However, a propensity to focus on the psychological dimensions of fear
tends to occlude a broader political, social, economic or cultural analysis of
the desire for success, mastery and competence and the correlative fear of
failure in the lived experience of everyday life. One of the problems facing
my students is that they had come to understand failure solely in ontologi-
cal terms, construed through the language of identity as a noun, as some-
thing one is, rather than as a verb, as something one does. This is not to
suggest, as behavioural psychology sometimes does, that one’s actions and
one’s being are separate—there are times at which our failures, be it
through action or inaction, strikes painfully at the heart of who we feel we
are. However, students in classrooms will rarely have done something to
merit such self-approbation and shame, yet still they view failure in terms
of their identities. If failure is construed in ontological terms, and if enquiry
into the conditions for and consequences of this relationship to failure is
lacking, this can lead to quasi-behavioural reactions to perceived failure or
the possibility of failure: the slightest hint of being lacking in some way can
bring students to experience affective responses that are part of the same
family of social affects that includes shame, embarrassment and humilia-
tion. This is instructive. Although not an affect itself, these affects that are
associated with the experience of the fear of failure, rather than necessarily
failure itself, are social affects; that is, they are precipitated by the (antici-
pated) judgement of the other or the failure to meet a perceived standard.
This is a delicate area. There are areas in life in which we might be said
to be lacking in our relation to others through indifference, insensitivity,
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cruelty or ambition. There are times when we rightfully feel ashamed
because we have fallen short of our values. Shame reveals to us that our
lives are bound up with those of others; however, shame becomes perni-
cious when the anticipated response of others operates in such a way as to
preclude us from living honestly and in accordance with our values. A
comparative culture that sees the path to human flourishing as one premised
upon an ideology of competition is the culture of contemporary capitalism.
However, despite the emphasis on success for all, it is the failure to be
successful in the terms dictated by society that is the dominant tenor of life
in contemporary capitalist, liberal society. Bare refusals to participate in
such an economy could help to interrupt the dominant logic of contempo-
rary capital premised on such a principle of competition. This is why, says
Calder, ‘His [Beckett’s] many written statements on the folly of ambition
and the irrelevance of failure to anything real are among his most potent
and comforting, because they help to remove a major anxiety. There is
neither fault nor shame in failure’ (2001, p. 9), adding, ‘[h]is self-
identification is always with the victim’ (2001, p. 106). Calder’s keen
observation that failure is irrelevant to anything real in Beckett is an
important one, yet, of course, Beckett is acutely aware that often we fail to
live a life that is ethical, and this is not a form of failure that is irrelevant.
FEAR OF FAILURE
Yes, I once took an interest in astronomy. I don’t deny it. Then it was
geology that killed a few years for me. The next pain in the balls was
anthropology and the other disciplines, such as psychiatry, that are
connected with it, disconnected and then connected again, according
to their latest discoveries. What I liked in anthropology was its inex-
haustible faculty of negation, its relentless definition of man, as
though he were no better than God, In terms of what he is not. But my
ideas on this subject were always horribly confused for my knowl-
edge of men was scant and the meaning of being beyond me (Beckett,
1979, p. 38).
Beckett’s wry descriptions of education, through the voices of his charac-
ters, offer a rather more circumspect and modest vision of education and its
achievements. Yet, Molloy, Worm and Moran’s reflections are not traversed
by fear, but only by mild confusion and occasional over-identification with
those purported aims. They seem a far cry from John Holt’s descriptions of
children in his classic text How Children Fail. Holt’s descriptions of the
experiences of children in schools are resonant with the experiences of my
students in teacher education, both as students and as student-teachers.
Failure in schools, as elsewhere, is understood in relation to the perceived
judgement of others. For many, schooldays constitute a period of unrelent-
ing failure to match the expectations of the teacher, the standards of the
national curriculum, and the knowledge of one’s peers. Oddly, a fear of
failure affects even those deemed most competent and apparently success-
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ful within the educational system. Thus, the other becomes, not one on
whom I may depend or who may depend on me, or someone in relation
with whom I may come to constitute myself, but simply a generic marker
indicating my relative success or failure.
I suggest that it is not failure per se that precipitates a feeling of humilia-
tion, shame or fear, but anticipated judgement: not being able to do some-
thing should not necessarily elicit the fear, shame, deference, ambition and
paralysis that have come to be associated with the prospect of failure. In a
set of diary entries, Holt considers the relationship to failure held by the
children in his classes. Schools cultivate, in his view, producers, rather
than thinkers. Producers look for the right answer, certainty and approval
and become concerned if they do not receive affirmation or if they get the
wrong answer. Holt wonders about the responses of children to the pros-
pect of failure. ‘Kids often resist understanding, make no effort to under-
stand, but they don’t often grasp an idea and then throw it away. . . . Can
a child have a vested interest in failure?’ (Holt, 1964, p. 19). Rather than
face the prospect of getting a wrong answer, they disengage: ‘The child
must be right. She cannot bear to be wrong, or even to imagine that she
might be wrong. When she is wrong, as she often is, the only thing to do
is to forget it as quickly as possible’ (1964, p. 27); or they panic: ‘She
closes her eyes and makes a dash for it, like someone running past a
graveyard on a dark night. No looking back afterwards, either’ (1964,
p. 24).
Holt writes of one child, ‘She also knows the teacher’s strategy of asking
questions of students who seem confused or not paying attention. She
therefore feels safe waving her hand in the air, as if she were bursting to tell
the answer’ (1964, p. 27). Holt calls one strategy ‘guess and look’, that is,
try to figure out from bodily and vocal cues the answer the teacher wants.
Teachers themselves can become so obsessed with their right answer that
they fail to hear the response of the child, intelligent as it may be. Describ-
ing the tenor of classroom life, he says,
Their attention depended on what was going on in class. Any raising
of the emotional temperature made them prick up their ears. If an
argument was going on, or someone was in trouble, or someone was
being laughed at for a foolish answer, they took notice. Or if you were
explaining something so simple that all the rest knew it, they would
wave their arms and give agonized, half-suppressed cries of O-o-o-o-
o-oh!’ [. . .] But most of the time, when explaining, questioning or
discussing was going on, the majority of children paid little attention
or none at all (1964, p. 35).
(Even though fifty years have passed since Holt’s book was published,
many people currently working in teacher education who are accustomed
to supervision in primary schools will be as familiar as he was with those
half-suppressed cries in certain schools.) The complicated relationship
between teaching and the children’s experience of, relationship to, and
attempts to avoid failure is traced through these descriptions. A further
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difficulty compounds matters—the teacher’s self-image, hopes and desires.
Holt writes, ‘The conscientious teacher thinks of himself as taking his
students (at least part way) on a journey to some glorious destination, well
worth the pains of the trip’ (1964, p. 36), however this was not how children
understood school and learning. They felt that they were in school because
they had to be. They had no real idea of where they were going, or why, but
they knew that they had to complete the tasks set before them if they wished
to avoid trouble.
Holt portrays the lived experience of children in visceral terms claiming
that many children are scared most of the time in schools, even those
schools that are kindest and gentlest, saying to witness the behaviour of
some children is akin to an animal fleeing danger. He asks us to pay
attention to the expressions on children’s faces, the way that they turn to
observe one another, and their bodily comportment when he remarks, ‘Now
it begins to look as if the expectation and fear of failure, if strong enough,
may lead children to act and think in a special way’ (1964, p. 39). Part of
the difficulty lies in the constant expectation of success, a culture that
values right answers rather than process, and behavioural management
strategies that do not acknowledge the child’s natural curiosity and desire
to learn but that are premised on the idea that children need to be coerced
into learning. Holt feels that we put children under intolerable and constant
pressure to meet predetermined standards and to match the abilities of their
peers. In response to this he proposes a thought experiment for teachers.
‘But suppose every teacher in the school were told he had to do ten pages
of addition problems, within a given time limit and with no mistakes, or
lose his job’ (1964, p. 52).
Another dimension to the problem is the broader cultural relationship to
failure that conceives it in the ontological terms outlined above, whereby
failure is seen as revelatory of the inadequacy of the self. Holt acknowl-
edges this whilst wondering why this is the case, ‘Of course, we adults tend
to see all small, specific failures, of our own or of children, as proof of
general failure, incompetence, worthlessness. Is it a cultural matter? Are
there no people in the world for whom it is not a disgrace to do something
badly?’ (1964, p. 59). Even strategies of praise and affirmation can unin-
tentionally serve to exacerbate feelings of worthlessness, in particular when
encouragement to meet the ‘self-concept’ attributed to one has been con-
founded. Rather than being an instance of failing, it constitutes a failure of
being. It is perhaps for this reason that ‘The strategies of most of these kids
have been consistently self-centred, self-protective, aimed above all else
at avoiding trouble, embarrassment, punishment, disapproval or loss of
status’ (1964, p. 59); this is similar to the list of the reasons offered to me
when I asked my students why they did not speak in tutorials. As Holt
recognises this is debilitating in many ways, including for thinking: there is
a difference between the figure of the ‘idiot’, like Molloy, who refuses to
know what ‘everyone knows’, and the scattered, panicked response to the
invitation to thinking and living outlined in the above quotations. A further
danger is that children come to develop a particular relation to authority
that conceives of it in terms of control, coming to desire the approval of the
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Master or the Other, who may present himself or herself, as Britzman
(2006) argues, as a being without vulnerability, averse to risk, wholly
adequate, godlike, wholly rational, without prejudice, and without fear.
This image of autonomy without dependency is a powerful one in educa-
tion, as Rachel Jones, in this issue, underlines. This is compounded by
the confusion that teachers make between good character and good
behaviour—good character may require contesting authority and going
against the grain, and such gestures by children often meet with hostility
and punishment by teachers.
The consequence of this is put starkly by Holt, ‘We destroy this capacity
above all by making them afraid, afraid of not doing what people want, of
not pleasing, of making mistakes, of failing, of being wrong. Thus we make
them afraid to gamble, afraid to experiment, afraid to try the difficult and
the unknown. Even when we do not create children’s fears, when they
come to us with fears ready-made and built-in, we use these fears as
handles to manipulate them and get them to do what we want’ (1964, p.
165). This, I suggest, leads to the translation of failure of doing into failure
of being. Why is it seen as a failure of one’s being to be unable to do
something?
I’LL GO ON
Certain of Molloy’s pious statements resonate rather uncomfortably with
Holt’s observations. He says,
I have only to be told what good behaviour is and I am well behaved
within the limits of my physical possibilities. And so I have never
ceased to improve, from this point of view, for I used to be intelligent
and quick. As far as good will is concerned, I had it to overflowing, the
exasperated good will of the over-anxious . . . And if I have always
behaved like a pig, the fault lies not with me but with my superiors,
who correct me only on points of detail instead of showing me the
essence of the system, after the manner of the great English schools,
and the guiding principles of good manner, and how to proceed,
without going wrong, from the former to the latter, and how to trace
back to its ultimate source a given comportment (Beckett, 1979,
p. 25).
Molloy does his best to respond to cues but he doesn’t really understand the
point of it all. Indeed, Beckett’s characters never quite fit, nor do they know
what to do, but, unlike most of the children described by Holt, they are not
weighed down by a sense of inadequacy born of comparison with others:
being adequate or inadequate is scarcely an issue for them.
Let us briefly imagine what education might be like if our relationship to
failure were to be reimagined. What if educational institutions were spaces
in which we tried things out? What if they were an exercise in ‘infancy’,
perpetual beginning, exposure and searching curiosity, as Rachel Jones, in
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this issue, describes. This does not imply a lack of persistence, diligence,
attention, or that we would never complete anything (completion and
success are not equivalent terms) but it means we might be liberated from
the forms of judgement that paralyse agency, and it might permit poetic
ruptures with cynicism and even a heightened awareness of the subtleties of
the ‘everyday’. A cue could be taken from contemporary artists like Francis
Alÿs. Alÿs engages in acts that are often impossible, futile or useless, such
as seeing how long he can wander with a 9mm pistol in his hand through
Mexico City before being arrested, or spending nine hours pushing an ice
block through city streets until it melts, or deploying a group of five
hundred volunteers to use shovels to move a sand dune four inches. These
exercises allow for a poetic disruption of the everyday, and can also serve
to reveal the reality of many of our working activities. Ignoring the impera-
tive of efficiency, Alÿs scrawls axioms such as ‘Maximum effort Minimum
result’ in his notebooks. Mark Godfrey referring to his ice-block pushing,
writes, ‘Here for the first time, the artist dramatized the aphorism that
“sometimes doing something leads to nothing”, expending maximum
energy with minimum results. The action reflected on the everyday pursuits
of all those working in the streets around him, and more generally on the
vanity of the modernising efforts of successive Latin-American govern-
ments’ (Godfrey and Biesenbach, 2010, p. 18). The axiom of ‘maximum
effort minimum result’ does not so much prescribe as describe in a way that
also forces Western culture, with its emphasis on productivity and effi-
ciency, what, with all our efforts, are we really doing? Do we have anything
to show for it all? Alÿs’s works have the same kind of effect as Beckett’s
characters—the uselessness of their actions can serve as a hiatus provoking
a distance from the immediate situation in which it seems obvious what
must do and who one must be. We are forced us to ask ourselves why
we assume our own actions have greater value than those of Murphy or
Molloy.
The fear of failure experienced by my students and those described by
Holt presupposed the possibility of being adequate and even successful. A
wilful blindness to the fact that not everyone can be ‘winners’, ‘heroes’,
‘achievers’ or even ‘all they can be’ persists, and there is insufficient
questioning at a policy level about which aspirations ought to be valued, or
whether they are even desirable. To what extent is an honest contemplation
of the human condition permitted in schools or colleges? A relationship to
failure is shaped through systems of assessment that rely on benchmarks
and standards, by standardised testing such as PISA, and by cultures in
schools and universities that reward success and differentiate students
through high stakes testing. This is not to suggest that an alternative would
be the kind of ‘entrepreneurial’ culture increasingly promoted by busi-
nesses seeking to intervene in educational life, as this also sets its sights on
success and ignores the inevitable hierarchy that emerges. Is there another
way of imagining the human condition that might allow for a more
subdued, nuanced and kinder philosophy of education? This is particularly
important when educating future teachers whose own fears and standards
may forbid the kinds of open experimentation and play with children
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that can invite critical enquiry, curiosity and exploration, as well varying
material engagements through practice in different disciplines. We could
learn from the ways that young children explore the world and bring some
of that attentiveness, interest and absorption into our own relationships with
the everyday.
A preliminary sketch of a Beckettian philosophy of education might
include the following: we are inadequate, but we muddle through; the
world is a mess, but we should face our situation with courage; education
will not change much, but for all that, it is often an enjoyable distraction;
we should be decent to other human beings, forgoing personal ambition
and the desire for prestige; there is no ultimate telos to a human life, but still
we persist, on; and we should try things out, experiment, without undue
concern about success or failure. Perhaps then experiences of education
might be more tolerable. Perhaps. Rather than experiencing oneself as a
failure, one fails, fails again, fails better, fails worse.
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NOTES
1. I think here of Bruce Naumann, Fischli and Weiss, Francis Alÿs, Thomas Hirschhorn or Fluxus who
try and tried to undermine a desire for control, mastery or autonomy, welcoming more gentleness,
humour, weakness or experimentation in both their work and in the relationship cultivated with
those encountering, or participating in, the work.
2. Whilst I acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on failure and education, one contribution
that Beckett makes is to help us to understand failure as part of the human condition. This is, in part,
why he and others of his generation are so critical of the administered society that seeks to eliminate
risk. This is a different point to the one made by writers like Melanie Philips who challenges the
idea that no one should fail. Similar criticism have been made in special needs education. The
normative position that no one should fail, fails to acknowledge the reality that we do fail, and in
many different ways. Children understand condescension. Conversely, there is a good deal of
literature that focuses on the effort to eliminate failure because of its effects on self-esteem.
However, perhaps, the real problem is learning how to fail. This is not to advocate an acquiescent
position that accepts under-resourced classrooms, poor treatment of children, and so forth. This
would constitute a kind of moral or ethical failure which Beckett deplores, but it is to explore a way
of looking at failure that has perhaps not been sufficiently explored in the literature.
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